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THE CARTELIZATION OF COMMERCE
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The topic of this short essay is whether we should be willing
to undo the New Deal. In order to attack this modest mission, I
shall first ask just what our nation hoped to achieve when it
put the New Deal into place. Once that question is understood,
I shall then ask whether it is worth undoing the New Deal. To
end the suspense, the answer is this: the quicker the New Deal
can be undone, the better.'
To explain why this recommendation is sound, we must
return to the fundamental question of what is meant by
"structural" Constitution and why it matters. The strong
temptation is to greet this inquiry with impatience. We think
about structure "merely" as a matter of form, or worse, as a
matter of formalism. Oftentimes, we think of it as wholly
unrelated to substance or even in sharp opposition to it. I hope
to show that this bifurcation between constitutional structure
and substantive law leads to most unsatisfactory conclusions.
I believe that the proper form of inquiry examines
governance structures by asking whether they advance a
worthy set of substantive ends. We must first defend these
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law
School.
1. As I have noted elsewhere, "[tihe New Deal is inconsistent with the principles of
limited government and with the constitutional provisions designed to secure that
end." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 281 (1985). For a more detailed exposition of my views on the New Deal and
the Commerce Clause, see Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power,
73 VA. L REv. 1387 (1987). For an opposing view of the New Deal, see 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Ackerman's theory, for all its
academic ingenuity, is a theory that requires judges to surrender to political pressures,
rather than adhering to their constitutional duty of interpreting constitutional text as
they think proper and then letting the political process lead to amendment, if
appropriate.
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ends, and then show how the proposed structures will help
achieve them. The strongest case against the New Deal thus
strikes at its unprincipled agnosticism toward the appropriate
form of social and economic life in the United States or, indeed,
anywhere else. Ultimately, what is at stake here is nothing less
than the key substantive choice about how to organize a
complex national economy.
As a matter of principle, a person could believe in a system
of open markets, to the extent that these are feasible and
possible, in which free entry, free exit, and the free movement
of prices, goods, and services are seen as promoting overall
social welfare. When firms fail, the appropriate response is not
to prop them up with subsidies, which will require taxing other
individuals and activities. Rather it is simply to let failing firms
go out of business, so that problems of excess supply can be
addressed through exit rather than through manipulation and
fine-tuning of an ever more stubborn market
In trying to figure out why one form of economic
organization is superior to another, we need to look at the
consequences that each generates. Here it behooves us to recall
the powerful economic theory that holds that open competition
will move us fairly dose to the social optimum while state
sponsored monopolies move us in the opposite direction. There
is nothing perfect about this process, to be sure, and any
economy will experience some bumps and turns in the road.
Yet, with all those qualifications, open competition will
outperform state-administered cartels in what would otherwise
be competitive industries.
II. TEE THREATS OF MONOPOLY

The judicial interpretation of the United States Constitution
before 1937 was by no means perfect, but at least it had the
virtue of responding to one dominant theme. The dangers of
monopoly lurk just about everywhere, and the Supreme Court,
through its own monopoly on judicial review, tried to broker
some accommodation between the multiple threats of
monopolization.
One of these threats is that of private monopolization.
Antitrust laws, either at the state or federal level, could in
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principle offer an appropriate response to this difficulty.2 A

second threat is that posed by state monopolies. To the extent
that states impose barriers to the movement of goods and
services in national markets, some national response seems
appropriate. Throughout its history, Congress has done little to
curb state restrictions on national markets that arise from
outright prohibition or discriminatory regulation and taxation,
all of which are designed to make it more difficult for out-ofstate firms to compete with their in-state rivals. To combat that
threat the Court has developed the negative or dormant
Commerce Clause. 3 Even if that doctrine is not explicitly
authorized by constitutional text, it certainly resonates very
powerfully with the general normative theory of competition
first.
A third potential monopolist, and the focus of our discussion
here, is the federal government. So long as it has extensive
national powers, it is able to exert cartel-like control over
production and distribution in national markets. Respecting the
original limitations on the scope of the federal commerce
power, however, impedes the ability of the United States to
organize cartels. If it lies beyond the power of the federal
government to regulate the activities of local manufacturers
and farmers, then how can it cartelize the marketing of their
goods?

III. THE NEW DEAL CASES
What is so striking about the Supreme Court's New Deal
jurisprudence is that, as best I can tell, it reads as though
interpretation of the structural Constitution should be keyed to
promote national cartels. One characteristic of industrial
planning during the 1930s, both in the United States and in
Europe, was the belief that state-administered cartels could
stabilize production and thus achieve desirable long-term
outcomes.
Consider, for example, Justice Cardozo's dissenting opinion
2. The most prominent example of such an antitrust law is the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 US.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
3. US. CONST. art I, § 8, cl 3. See Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mica L. REV. 1091

(1986).
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in Carterv. Carter Coal Co.4 Justice Cardozo asserts that, when

prices start to go down because of intense competition, the
federal government under the Commerce Clause has the power
to prop them up. Supporters of cartelization believed that the
great vice of capitalism is that it allows orderly exit from the
market to occur. It was under such a misconception that the
National Industrial Recovery Act, which the Court struck down
in A. L. A. Schechter Corp. v. UnitedStates,5 was implemented.

The same efforts to support cartel structures were also found
in UnitedStates v. Butler,6 where the United States sought to use
its spending power to rig national agricultural production to
prevent "overproduction" without having to allow some
farmers to go out of business.7 The government imposed a set
of taxes upon the various local farmers, put the revenues from
those taxes into the national treasury, and then remitted those
particular taxes only to those farmers who reduced their
acreage under cultivation. 8 The deal looked powerfully
coercive when viewed from the perspective of an individual
farmer: the tax was precisely calculated so that if a farmer
decided to stay out of the acreage reduction program he would
go out of business. So farmers stayed in. The net effect of the
program, therefore, was to transfer money from the farmer to
the federal government and then back to the individual farmer.
The back and forth movement of cash was a wash. But the real
change was that the total amount of agricultural production
was reduced which kept prices at an artificially high level. The
program was a textbook illustration of the use of government
power to advance monopoly behavior.
The Court invalidated the tax by finding that coercion was
directed to individual farmers,9 but that short-sighted view
oversimplified the situation. To be sure, some farmers were
opposed to all forms of crop support and acreage limitations on
4. 298 US. 238, 324 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Today this dissent no doubt
represents the law.
5. 295 US. 495, 523-24 (1935) (noting that the Live Poultry Code, under which
defendants were convicted, regulated the sale, purchase for resale, transportation, and
handling of live poultry "from the time such poultry comes into the New York
metropolitan area to the time it is first sold in slaughtered form").

6. 297 US. 1 (1936) (striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
7. See id. at 53-56 (describing relevant provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act).
8. See id. at 53-59.
9. See id. at 70-71.
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principle. But for many farmers the program operated as a
political solution to a "prisoner's dilemma" game in which all
farmers would otherwise defect (by planting excessive
acreage); to the extent that individual farmers were coerced, it
was for their own benefit. The tax and rebate system therefore
was an ingenious effort to use the Spending Clause to get
around then-applicable limitations on the Commerce Clause
which would not permit Congress to issue a flat prohibition on
planting more than the specified number of acres. The true
losers in this elaborate scheme of tax and rebate were the same
individuals who would have lost from a direct restriction on
acreage. It was consumers who suffered because they were
forced to deal with stable cartels instead of competitive
markets.
Schechter, Carter, and Butler were all decided before the
constitutional revolution of 1937. In them one can sense that a
fragile majority of the Supreme Court had a dim appreciation
of the dangers of this sort of industrial policy with its rigging of
the markets. The majority's willingness to strike down these
efforts at cartelization showed how sound constitutional
structure could work in aid of sound national policy10
Unfortunately, the judicial will did not endure; when the
pressure mounted, the Court, as is so often the case, retreated.
By the time we reach the National Labor Relations Act cases
in 1937,11 the mood shifts. Now it appears as though the large
impacts that labor unions have on national markets is a reason
to regulate them at the federal level and thus to promote the
organization of labor cartels through mandatory collective
bargaining. Once this happens, of course, the Court must
backtrack and rethink what it has done with agricultural goods
and natural resources. The upshot is the decision in Wickard v.
Filburn,where Justice Jackson sustains the use of the Commerce
Clause to prevent a farmer from growing grain for his own
livestock' 2 In its odd way, Justice Jackson's decision is surely
correct, for if the object is to maintain a nationwide cartel, then
10. See, e.g, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 US. 238 (1936) (striking down provisions
of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act controlling the wages, hours, and working
conditions of miners); A. L A. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 US. 495 (1935)

(striking down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that regulated the
wages and hours of labor of persons employed in the internal commerce of a State).
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US. 1 (1937).

12. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
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Congress must find ways to curtail local sales and local
consumption. We find out that what the Court cares about is
not the ultimate structure of the national market but rather the
power of the political branches to decide the particular form
that any national market will take. Competition and
cartelization are just two alternative forms of economic
organization. No value judgment can be made, at least
judicially, about their comparative worth.
This approach, I think, marks the endorsement of a very
important mistake. We need to consider very carefully which
matters a Court should constitutionalize and which matters it
ought to leave to the political process. To the extent that we are
able to make uniform and permanent judgments about the
desirability of one form of arrangement relative to another,
then we have a candidate for systematic constitutional
protection. To the extent that we are dealing with questions
such as which wars to fight or treaties to sign, we cannot hope
to have any degree of confidence in a general rule.
Accordingly, we ought to commit such matters to the
legislative and the executive branches. 13 By this test, the pre1937 understanding of the Commerce Clause was superior
because it made it much more difficult to organize national
cartels. For this reason, the pre-1937 view should be defended
on structural grounds.
By way of important caveat, it would be a mistake to say that
these are the only grounds that matter. But here the textual
arguments that set commerce in opposition to manufacture and
production are strong enough to carry the day in their own
right. What an appreciation of structure does is to knock out
any dubious claim that some structural argument cuts against
textual ones so that the 1937 Court was right to treat the former
as more important than the latter. Quite simply, both strands of
constitutional interpretation moved neatly in tandem.
IV. DISMANTLING FEDERAL POWER: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Those who disagree with my arguments might claim that
courts should not be making these types of policy decisions
because they lack the competence to make informed judgments
about complex economic arrangements. It is, we are told,
13. See, e.g., US. CoNST. arL II, § 2, c 2
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always a mistake to take economic issues from the political
branches which are far better able to handle them. In my view,
this argument is mistaken.
In order to see the error, let us look briefly at the current
situation under the dormant Commerce Clause.14 What we
observe is a completely different constellation of constitutional
values. There the Court takes charge and makes profound
decisions on state regulation. Perhaps the Court is emboldened
because it knows that Congress can overturn its decisions if it
thinks them incorrect (although they rarely are).1 5 But what is
so striking is the rhetoric that the Court uses to support its
decisions. It displays the firm conviction that the main judicial
goal is to preserve competition in the national market from
state regulation. Once the justices start from the right view of
their goal, they do a good job in protecting competition and
free markets.
When the Supreme Court has scrutinized state agricultural
adjustment programs under the negative Commerce Clause,
the Court has had the good sense to strike them down. For
14. As I have explained elsewhere, the negative or dormant Commerce Clause
power "prohibits states from intruding on the federal authority over interstate
commerce even absent any congressional legislation on the subject of the state action."
Epstein, ProperScope, supranote 1, at 1408.
The negative Commerce Clause is essentially an interpretation of congressional
silence-the Court assumes that the Founders and the Congress intended for interstate
commerce to be the exclusive province of the federal government See Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) ("It has been contended by the counsel for the
appellant, that, as the word 'to regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing
to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the
same operation on the same thing .... There is great force in this argument, and the
Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted"). But see Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 US. (2 Pet) 245, 252 (1829) (upholding state statute against negative
Commerce Clause challenge, stating, "[if congress had passed any act which bore
upon the case; any act in execution of the power to regulate commerce, the object of
which was to control state legislation... we should feel not much difficulty in saying
that a state law coming in conflict with such act would be void. But congress has
passed no such act").
15. The regulation of insurance offers an excellent example of Congress overturning
a decision by the Court in order to preserve state authority to regulate interstate
commerce. In United States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAss'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the
Court interpreted an act of Congress broadly to cover insurance despite prior rulings
stating that insurance did not constitute interstate commerce. The Court assumed that
"Congress wanted to go the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining
trust and monopoly agreements" and held that insurance was covered by antitrust
laws. Id. at 558. In response, the Congress enacted the McCarran Act, 15 US.C. §§ 10111015 (1945), which overturned South-Eastern Underwriters and thereby preserved state
authority to regulate insurance. The Court, in turn, upheld the McCarran Act as a
constitutional delegation of congressional power to the states in PrudentialInsuranceCo.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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instance, the Court recently decided West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy,16 a case involving the administration and regulation of
dairy prices in Massachusetts. Massachusetts imposed a
uniform tax on all dairy producers, whether inside or outside
the state, and then took the tax proceeds and gave subsidies
only to in-state producers.' 7 The state argued that there was no
cause for complaint about this particular form of tax because it
was uniform with respect to everybody.' 8 The Court indicated
it was not faced with a very difficult problem at all. To the
extent that Massachusetts placed a tax on all producers while
providing a rebate only to some, the result was a differential
cross-subsidy. Massachusetts was effectively imposing a tax on
out-of-state producers for the benefit of in-state producers,
even though such a policy would surely hurt, to some extent,
Massachusetts consumers. The Court dutifully invalidated the
tax.19
The courts, I submit, should be equally assertive in
protecting the substantial ends of the Constitution against
federal programs as well. The courts should reverse the
limitless reading of the Commerce Clause and reject the
implicit economic logic that underlies the vast expansion of
federal power: agnosticism between state-rigged cartels on the
one hand and purely competitive processes on the other.
Markets are not perfect; they do not always clear and all sorts
of perturbations can happen. The weaknesses of markets,
however, are aggravated tenfold by the presence of organized
state cartels. The only question, to my mind, then, is how we
can dismantle the federal power.
It will take more than a single constitutional decision. It will
actually take some loyalty by the state appellate court judges
and by the federal circuit court judges to push United States v.
Lopez20 beyond its currently embattled position. Our task is not
to work the political revolution in a moment. Our task is
simply to understand that there is a strong intellectual case for
16. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
17. See id. at 188-92

18. See id. at 198 (noting the respondent's argument that the tax was valid because of
its "nondiscriminatory" nature).
19. See id. at 188,207.
20. 514 US. 549 (1995). For my views on Lopez and a broader discussion of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Richard A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaith and the
Commerce Clause,71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1996).
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recognizing that the pre-1937 synthesis on these issues was, in
fact, more intellectually coherent than the post-1937 approach.
Precisely because we do have competitive national markets, we
do not want national powers to regulate the wages and prices
in those markets.
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